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Electronic Records and the Law of 
Evidence in Canada: The Uniform 
Electronic Evidence Act Twelve  
Years Later
LUCIANA DURANTI, CORINNE ROGERS, and ANTHONY 
SHEPPARD
RÉSUMÉ Cet article analyse la pertinence du Uniform Electronic Evidence Act, 
douze ans après son adoption, pour traiter de la complexité des documents créés, 
consultés ou conservés dans un environnement numérique. Face aux changements 
rapides dans le domaine de la technologie, les auteurs croient qu’on ne peut pas 
tenir compte de la nature et des caractéristiques des documents numériques en 
effectuant de simples modifications à la loi existante, mais qu’on doit faire promulguer 
une nouvelle législation qui tiendra compte de la collaboration étroite entre les 
professionnels qui travaillent dans les domaines des documents d’archives, du droit 
et du respect de la loi, et des technologies de l’information. Les nouveaux règlements, 
couvrant l’ensemble des questions liées à la pertinence, l’admissibilité et le poids 
de la preuve documentaire électronique, devront être basés à la fois sur le corpus 
du savoir de chaque profession, les résultats de la recherche interdisciplinaire et 
les normes existantes par rapport aux documents d’archives. La promulgation de 
tels règlements aiderait les tribunaux à tirer des conclusions exactes, basées sur des 
documents numériques créés dans des environnements fiables et conservés sous forme 
authentique aussi longtemps que nécessaire, ce qui amoindrirait la confusion continue 
au sujet de l’admissibilité et de l’usage des documents numériques dans les procès.
ABSTRACT This article analyzes the adequacy of The Uniform Electronic Evidence 
Act, twelve years after its adoption, in dealing with the complexity of the records 
created, used, or stored in the digital environment. In the face of rapidly changing 
technology, the authors believe that the nature and characteristics of electronic records 
cannot be accounted for by simple modifications to the existing law of evidence, 
but require a new enactment following upon a close collaboration among records 
professions, legal and law enforcement professions, and the information technology 
profession. The new rules, comprehensively encompassing issues of relevance, 
admissibility, and weight of electronic documentary evidence, must be based on the 
body of knowledge of each profession, on the findings of interdisciplinary research, 
and on existing records-related standards. The enactment of such rules would help the 
courts make accurate findings of fact, based on electronic records that are created in 
a reliable environment and preserved in an authentic form for as long as they might 
be needed, and would alleviate ongoing confusion about the admissibility and use of 
electronic records in litigation. 
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Introduction
The very sanctity of the place demonstrates the inviolability of archives, for they 
used to be in temples … Nor have archives ceased to be inviolate even though today 
they are not in temples. Rightly, says Ulpian, do we call inviolate those things which 
are neither sacred nor profane, but confirmed with a certain inviolability. What 
is supported by a certain sanctity, that is inviolate though it be not consecrated to 
God. Marcianus also says that is inviolate which is protected and fortified against 
injury by man … Therefore, even now it is permissible to call archives inviolate 
… In agreement … are Bartholus, Baldus, Alexander, Jason, Castrensis and other 
interpreters of civil law everywhere in the Authentica ad haec, in the Codex, “On the 
Reliability of Instruments.
— Baldassare Bonifacio, 16321
As argued by Bonifacio in his treatise about archives, Roman jurisprudence, 
as well as Roman law and, later, canon law, considered records, regardless 
of their age or antiquity, as implicitly trustworthy, not only because they 
were kept in inviolable places, but also because they were under the shield of 
“skilled and painstaking men” called by various names, such as “archivists 
(archivista) … custodians (custos) … keepers of the chests (scriniarius).” 
As a consequence of their inviolate nature, records were regarded as “useful 
for instructing and teaching men … for clearing up and illustrating obscure 
matters …for conserving patrimonies and thrones, all things public and 
private … as much better than navy yards, as much more efficacious than 
munitions factories, as it is finer to win by reason rather than by violence, by 
right rather than by wrong.”2  
In the twelfth and thirteen centuries, Roman law spread throughout Europe 
as the Jus Commune or common law, which remained as the foundation of 
the Jus Singulare or individual law of each country. Given the credibility 
attributed by the Jus Commune to records, forgery became a widespread 
problem, to the point that specific rules had to be introduced to prevent it, 
such as a requirement of great formality in the creation and structuring of the 
original record, and a requirement of authentication by experts whenever a 
record was offered as proof of a fact at issue. This adaptation of the law to the 
circumstances of the times is at the root of the two basic rules of evidence at 
common law: 1) the best evidence rule, which requires that an original record 
be submitted as evidence whenever possible, and 2) the authentication rule, 
which requires that either direct or circumstantial evidence be presented that a 
record submitted as evidence of a fact at issue is what it purports to be.3  
1 Lester K. Born, “Baldassare Bonifacio and His Essay De Archivis,” The American Archivist, 
vol. IV, no. 4 (October 1941), p. 236.
2 Ibid., p. 234.
3 Heather MacNeil, Trusting Records: Legal, Historical, and Diplomatic Perspectives 
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However, it was only in response to the doctrinal conflicts of the 
Reformation and Counter Reformation of the seventeenth century that a 
systematic method was developed to determine the authenticity of records. The 
publication of De Re Diplomatica in 1681 – the treatise by Dom Jean Mabillon 
that provided the tools for assessing the conformity of a record’s elements 
of form to established procedures, thereby establishing its authenticity4 
– supported the philosophy of rationalist empiricism, and paved the way for 
the development of the concept of evidence as inference5 and for exceptions to 
another basic rule of evidence at common law, the hearsay rule. According to 
this rule, documents offered as evidence are hearsay as they contain assertions 
made outside a court of law. However, on the grounds of necessity (absence 
of other available evidence) and circumstantial probability of trustworthiness, 
records, that is, documents made or received in the course of business and 
kept for the needs of such business, could be considered admissible, because 
the process of their creation made them more likely to be reliable, unless the 
opposing litigant showed the contrary.6 
By the nineteenth century, business records were regarded by common law 
rules of evidence as likely to be reliable if they also complied with the best 
evidence and the authentication rules. Today, the legal rules governing the use 
of documentary evidence, although several times refined and extended, are 
very similar to those established at the end of the nineteenth century. These 
rules have always been of direct interest to records professionals responsible 
for the creation and maintenance of records for obvious reasons, while they 
have not usually concerned those responsible for the long-term preservation 
of records, primarily because their responsibilities did not extend to a direct 
involvement with the first part of the records life cycle, and did not have an 
impact on the form and integrity of the records through time. This situation 
changed as soon as archivists became involved with electronic records.7  
It is a fact established by research and experience that we cannot preserve 
electronic records, but only our capacity to reproduce them time after time, 
(Dordrecht, 2000), p. 3. For a discussion of common law versus civil law, see pp. 32–35.
4 See Luciana Duranti, “Diplomatics: New Uses for an Old Science,” Archivaria 28 (Summer 
1989), pp. 7–27.
5 See MacNeil, Trusting Records, pp. 20–24.
6 See John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 11 vols. (Boston, 1972–1983; 
rev. 1974), Vol. 5, para. 1632.
7 The ability to preserve reliable and authentic electronic records depends on the circumstanc-
es of their creation and maintenance, requiring archivists (trusted custodians) to advise on 
matters related to those processes, and records managers to understand the implications of 
record creation and maintenance for long-term preservation. See Yvette Hackett, “Methods 
of Appraisal and Preservation,” in International Research on Permanent Authentic Records 
In Electronic Systems (InterPARES) 2: Experiential, Interactive and Dynamic Records, eds. 
Luciana Duranti and Randy Preston (Padova, 2008), available at http://www.interpares.org/
ip2/display_file.cfm?doc=ip2_book_appendix_19.pdf (accessed on 18 October 2009).
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in a continuing effort to beat technological obsolescence.8 The nature of 
electronic records challenges traditional rules of evidence and procedure, 
and requires their reformulation. For example, the traditional best evidence 
rule is no longer relevant because of the absence of an original in the digital 
environment. The authentication rule also is inadequate, because it cannot be 
established that an electronic record is the same as its first instantiation simply 
by looking at the record itself, but it is necessary to refer to an unbroken 
line of traces left by all those who interacted with the record or to the 
legitimate custody of a professional who can account for them.9 Furthermore, 
the complexity and variety of digital information systems and the often 
uncontrolled ways in which they are used, make it difficult to identify records 
within them and the business activities to which they are linked, thereby 
challenging the application of the business records exception to the hearsay 
rule. Finally, ever-changing technology speeds up the obsolescence not only of 
earlier record-making processes, but also of the laws regulating admissibility.
Therefore, all records professionals responsible for creating, managing, 
maintaining, and preserving records inviolate over time are – or should be – 
very much concerned with what the law has to say about the admissibility 
and weight of electronic records. No one would question the responsibilities 
of managers of current records to maintain record-keeping systems that offer 
reliability, integrity, compliance, comprehensiveness, and systematization in 
order to create and maintain records that have integrity and are authentic, 
reliable, and useable. Archivists are also increasingly assuming responsibility 
for the unprecedented quantity and number of formats of digital material 
that could be introduced in litigation. The voices of records managers and 
archivists alike are needed to participate in the monitoring of existing rules 
and, if reform is needed, in the elaboration of new rules capable of supporting 
their efforts of protecting the trustworthiness of the records for as long as they 
exist. 
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the Uniform Electronic Evidence 
8 For example, see Luciana Duranti, Jim Suderman, and Malcolm Todd, “A Framework of 
Principles for the Development of Policies, Strategies and Standards for the Long-term 
Preservation of Digital Records,” in International Research, eds. Duranti and Preston, 
Appendix 19, p. 1. 
9 For a discussion of the characteristics of electronic records and their implication for the 
assessment of their authenticity see Heather MacNeil, “Providing Grounds for Trust: 
Developing Conceptual Requirements for the Long-term Preservation of Electronic 
Records,” Archivaria 50 (Fall 2000), pp. 52–78, and Luciana Duranti and Kenneth 
Thibodeau, “The Concept of Record in Interactive, Experiential and Dynamic 
Environments: the View of InterPARES,” Archival Science, vol. 6, no. 1 (2006), pp. 13–68, 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10502-006-9021-7 (accessed on 18 October 2009). See 
also Luciana Duranti, “From Digital Diplomatics to Digital Records Forensics,” Archivaria 
68 (Fall 2009), pp. 39–66.
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Act, the 1998 Canadian legal system’s statutory response to the growing 
use of digital technology as the primary means of conducting activities and 
producing records. We explore why the Act, now twelve years old, has not had 
a more significant impact on case law, despite still constituting the core of the 
Canadian law approach to digital documentary evidence.10 We argue that the 
development of rules governing the ability of electronic records to be used 
as evidence throughout their life cycle depends on records that are reliable at 
creation, and that are maintained trustworthy and inviolate through time and 
over the long term. We believe that this requires close research collaboration 
not only between the records (records managers and archivists) and legal 
(lawyers, judges, notaries) professions, but also between these and the law 
enforcement and information technology professions, and that the conceptual 
and methodological body of knowledge of diplomatics, digital forensics, and 
archival science should guide such research. 
Documentary Evidence – A Primer
The law of evidence, which still regulates proof in Canadian courts and 
tribunals, originated in England long before the computer and electronic 
recordkeeping. Ancient courts developed common law evidentiary rules to 
deal with the admissibility of hand-written parchment and paper records. In 
drawing these rules, and through subsequent reforms, the courts were careful 
to strike a balance between providing ease of proof of trustworthy records and 
avoiding, as much as possible, risks of fraud, forgery, and unreliability. 
As the common law rules lagged behind developments in record-making 
and record-keeping practices, reforms began in earnest in the nineteenth 
century. They have continued ever since as the pace of technological advances 
accelerates. In the late twentieth century, computerization of commercial 
transactions and recordkeeping seemed to reformers to be so far ahead of 
the common law and statutory rules as to require more specific changes. 
Responding to these concerns, many jurisdictions enacted legislation to 
facilitate electronic transactions and recordkeeping so that electronic records 
could be admitted in proceedings as legal proof. These other jurisdictions 
adopted comprehensive provisions broadly regulating the admissibility and 
procedure governing computer evidence with updating amendments from time 
to time.11 Diverging widely from these jurisdictions despite the similarity of 
10 A discussion of the Act can also be found in MacNeil, Trusting Records, pp. 51–54.
11 See for example the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Project No. 27, Part 
1: Report on the Admissibility in Evidence of Computer Records and Other Documentary 
Statements (Perth, 1980); Council of Europe, Harmonization of Laws Relating to the 
Requirement of Written Proof and to the Admissibility of Reproductions of Documents and 
Recordings on Computers: Recommendation No. R (81) 20 Adopted by the Committee of 
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our common law heritage and the problems to be addressed, the Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada (the major law reform agency in Canada [hereinafter 
ULCC]), took a minimalist approach to reform, and has not updated its initial 
provisions to meet the changing demands of technological advances. Whereas 
the other jurisdictions did not specifically deal with the best evidence and 
authentication rules in their broader reforms, the ULCC limited its narrower 
approach to those two rules. The need to keep law current with technological 
changes, especially in the areas of evidence and procedure, cannot be satisfied 
by legislation issued at a single point in time, but requires continuous and 
sustained updating.12
Even in the absence of legislation, some judges have expressed a 
willingness to admit new forms of evidence resulting from advances in 
technology, as long as their reliability was not disputed and they did not 
disrupt either the traditional roles of judge and jury, or court processes.13 
However, judges have also expressed a conservative point of view against 
initiating broad reforms of the common law rules of evidence to meet modern 
needs, preferring to encourage the legislatures to take on this sort of project.14 
Currently, the Supreme Court of Canada expresses a preference for confining 
the courts’ role to initiating only “incremental” updating of the common law 
to meet changing times, leaving broader reforms of complex areas to the 
legislature.15 Comprehensive and continuing reform of the procedural and 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on 11 December 1981 and Explanatory Memorandum 
(Strasbourg, 1982); Queensland Law Reform Commission, The Receipt of Evidence by 
Queensland Courts: Electronic Records, Issues Paper WP No. 52 (Brisbane, 1998). 
12 See also Lyria Bennett Moses, “Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up With 
Technological Change,” UNSWLRS 21 (2007), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/journals/UNSWLRS/2007/21.html (accessed on 8 June 2010).
13 R. v. Béland, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398, 43 D.L.R. (4th) 641, para. 20; R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 
S.C.R. 1197, 141 D.L.R. (4th) 647.
14 Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1965] A.C. 1001 (H.L), not followed in Ares v. 
Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608, 14 D.L.R. (3d) 4. 
15 R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, 1991 CanLII 59 (S.C.C.); Grant v. Torstar, [2009] 3 
S.C.R. 640, 2009 SCC 61, para. 46; in Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750, McLachlin 
J. (as she then was) for the court said: “Generally speaking, the judiciary is bound to apply 
the rules of law found in the legislation and in the precedents. Over time, the law in any given 
area may change; but the process of change is a slow and incremental one, based largely on the 
mechanism of extending an existing principle to new circumstances. While it may be that some 
judges are more activist than others, the courts have generally declined to introduce major and 
far-reaching changes in the rules hitherto accepted as governing the situation before them. 
There are sound reasons supporting this judicial reluctance to dramatically recast established 
rules of law. The court may not be in the best position to assess the deficiencies of the existing 
law, much less problems which may be associated with the changes it might make. The court 
has before it a single case; major changes in the law should be predicated on a wider view of 
how the rule will operate in the broad generality of cases. Moreover, the court may not be in a 
position to appreciate fully the economic and policy issues underlying the choice it is asked to 
make. Major changes to the law often involve devising subsidiary rules and procedures relevant 
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evidentiary aspects of digital records is a matter for legislatures, not for the 
courts. 
In the common law tradition, proof of the facts at issue is sought through 
sworn oral testimony. If oral testimony is unavailable, records attesting to the 
facts may be offered as evidence in its place. Records, however, are considered 
a form of hearsay, and are technically inadmissible. This hearsay rule is 
overly restrictive, and, in practice, the inadmissibility of hearsay has been 
tempered at common law by certain exception rules and the “best evidence” 
rule. Exception rules depend on proof that the records submitted are reliable 
and necessary. Traditionally, the common law requirement of authentication 
asks a litigant offering a disputed paper record into evidence to preface its 
admissibility with foundation evidence, that is, with evidence external to 
the record identifying it as authentic and relating it to the issues in dispute. 
Usually a witness with personal knowledge of the record would fulfill such 
requirement by recognizing the record and explaining its relevance to the 
dispute. This requirement continues to apply to electronic records. 
The common law best evidence rule required the litigant who sought to 
offer a record as proof of its contents to submit the original; however, if the 
original was unavailable for a legitimate reason, other means of proof of the 
contents of the (missing) original were acceptable. While the same witness 
who authenticated the record would usually be sufficiently knowledgeable to 
testify that it was the original, if the original were missing, the inquiry would 
turn to the legitimacy of the reason for its absence before other (secondary) 
evidence of its contents, such as the testimony of someone who had read the 
record, could be ruled admissible. Since at least the 1980s, Canadian courts 
have acknowledged that technological advances, such as photocopying and 
microfilming, eliminate the necessity of a strict observance of the best 
evidence rule.16 Recent scholarship has eroded the application of the best 
evidence rule further, as it is recognized that the concept of original has lost 
its meaning for electronic records.
Another challenge recognized by the courts in receiving computer-
generated or stored records derives from the fact that they may lack stability 
of form and content, and can be displayed on a variety of media, but it is not a 
bar to admissibility.17 
to their implementation, a task which is better accomplished through consultation between 
courts and practitioners than by judicial decree. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there 
is the long-established principle that in a constitutional democracy it is the legislature, as the 
elected branch of government, which should assume the major responsibility for law reform.”
16 Papalia v. R., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 256, 93 D.L.R. (3d) 161; Kamloops Square Management Ltd. 
v. Baron, [2006] BCCA 37, 51 B.C.L.R. (4th) 360, at para. 14–16; Shanghai v. Mozaffarian, 
[2002] BCCA 571, [2002] B.C.J. No. 216 (QL), at para. 22.
17 R. v. Bell and Bruce, [1982] 35 O.R. (2d) 65 C.C.C. (2d) 377 (C.A.), aff’d [1985] S.C.R. 287; 
R. v. Lemay, [2004] BCCA 604, 247 D.L.R. (4th) 470, at para. 33.
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The Uniform Electronic Evidence Act18
The ULCC19 comprises representatives of the federal, provincial and territorial 
governments of Canada, and various law reform agencies. It uses committees 
of experts to develop model legislation on various topics for possible adoption 
by the Parliament of Canada, and by the legislative assemblies of provinces 
and territories. In 1997, the ULCC adopted in principle the text of a proposed 
Uniform Electronic Evidence Act [hereinafter the UEEA, or the Act], and 
sought consultation prior to final approval.20 At its next annual meeting, the 
ULCC officially adopted the UEEA21 as a model legislation that proposed 
reform of the traditional common law evidentiary requirements for proof 
of authentication and best evidence, on the grounds that, while these rules 
worked well enough for paper records, they could not deal adequately with 
electronic ones.22   
Most Canadian jurisdictions welcomed the UEEA’s new approach to 
the admissibility of electronic records. In terms of general acceptance and 
implementation, the Act was a great success, and literally became uniform law 
across Canada, regulating the admissibility of electronic records offered into 
evidence in all criminal and most civil, quasi-criminal, and administrative 
proceedings. Four Canadian jurisdictions declined to adopt the UEEA: British 
Columbia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Quebec. New 
Brunswick and Quebec enacted distinctive provisions, which, however, do not 
apply to criminal proceedings.23 Because the Canadian federal system confers 
legislative jurisdiction over criminal matters on the Parliament of Canada, 
the Canada Evidence Act, which includes the UEEA’s provisions in sections 
37.1–37.6, prevails in criminal proceedings anywhere in Canada, including 
provinces that did not adopt the Act for other types of proceedings within 
their jurisdiction. Even though British Columbia did not adopt it as such, the 
Act did influence provisions of the British Columbia Evidence Act relating to 
the requirements for proof for electronic court records.24  
18 The text of the Act is reproduced for reference in the Appendix.
19 See http://www.ulcc.ca (accessed on 20 May 2010).
20 John Gregory, “Canadian Uniform Electronic Evidence Act,” available at http://jya.com/
eueea.htm (accessed on 20 May 2010).
21 Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (UEEA), available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.
cfm?sec=1&sub=1u2 (accessed on 20 May 2010)
22 For a discussion of the background to the UEEA, see Ken Chasse, “Electronic Records 
As Documentary Evidence,” Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 6, no. 3 
(November 2007), pp. 141–62, available at http://cjlt.dal.ca/vol6_no3 (accessed on 20 May 
2010).
23 New Brunswick, Evidence Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. E-11, sections 47.1 and, 47.2; Quebec, 
Civil Code of Quebec, articles 2837–2840; and An Act to Establish a Legal Framework for 
Information Technology, R.S.Q. 2001, chapter C-1.1.
24 Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124, sections 41.1–41.4.
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Jurisdictions chose to adopt the UEEA in one of two ways. Most 
legislatures, including the federal one, implemented the provisions of the 
UEEA by renumbering them and inserting them as amendments into their 
pre-existing evidence acts.25 Two legislatures (PEI and the Yukon Territory) 
enacted the Act as a distinct statute, physically separate in the statute books 
from their evidence acts.26 Regardless of which mode of implementation was 
adopted to determine the Act’s physical location in the statute books, courts 
faced a common problem of statutory interpretation: how to reconcile the new 
provisions with the common law and statutory rules that already dealt with 
electronic records. In 2004, the Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan 
(LRCS) expressed concern about problems that might arise because of lack 
of integration of the electronic records provisions with other evidentiary 
provisions.27 For example, the electronic records requirements do not expressly 
refer to pre-existing rules for the admissibility of business records, rules 
that define them as including electronic records by using the phrase “any 
information that is recorded or stored by means of a device.”28 However, 
the LRCS did not regard the problems as sufficiently serious or practical to 
warrant amendments in the direction of integration.
Courts have reached diverse conclusions about the interface between 
existing evidentiary provisions and the new ones introduced by the Act. In 
R. v. Bishop,29 the learned judge described the new rules as a “mini-code,” 
implying that, as far as they went, they were complete and prevailed over other 
provisions, an interpretation that would maximize their impact. In contrast, in 
R. v. Ganes,30 the learned judge held that existing provisions for admissibility 
of professional reports regarding licensing and signature regardless of form 
(as opposed to business records) prevailed over the new rules (which address 
requirements for authentication and best evidence). Electronic records, 
25 Canada, The Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-5, sections 31.1–31.8; Alberta, Alberta 
Evidence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-18, sections 41.1–41.8; Manitoba, The Manitoba Evidence 
Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. E150, C.C.S.M. c. E150, sections 51.1–51.8; Ontario, Evidence Act, 
R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, section 34.1; Northwest Territories, Evidence Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, 
c. E-8, section 37.1; Nova Scotia, Evidence Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 154, sections 23A–23H; 
Nunavut, Evidence Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. E-8, section 37.1 as enacted for Nunavut 
pursuant to section 29 of the Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28; Saskatchewan, Evidence Act, S.S. 
2006, c. E-11.2, section 54.
26 Prince Edward Island, Electronic Evidence Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E-4.3; Yukon Territory, 
Electronic Evidence Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 67.
27 Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan (LRCS), Research Paper, The Saskatchewan 
Evidence Act: A Review, pp. 32–35, available at http://sklr.sasktelwebhosting.com/ (accessed 
on 20 May 2010). The paper refers to sections 29.1–29.6 of the previous Evidence Act, which 
were re-enacted in 2006 as section 54 of the current Evidence Act.
28 See for example Canada Evidence Act, subsection 30 (12); B.C. Evidence Act, subsection 
42(1), Manitoba Evidence Act, subsection 49(1); and Ontario Evidence Act, subsection 35(1). 
29 R. v. Bishop, [2007] ONCJ 441, at para. 30. 
30 R. v. Ganes, [2005] S.J. No. 832 (Prov. Ct.).
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according to the learned judge, were only admissible if they complied with the 
requirements of existing provisions, an interpretation that would minimize the 
effect of the new requirements.31  
The merits of the UEEA have also received recognition outside Canada. 
For example, the Commonwealth Secretariat acknowledged drawing upon the 
ULCC’s Act in drafting its own report on model electronic records legislation 
for small member states in the Commonwealth of Nations.32 However, despite 
its general adoption in Canada and its influence abroad, the UEEA has 
received very little judicial consideration or application in the past twelve 
years.33 Why is this the case?  
In our view, as the years have gone by and the implications of the pervasive 
use of digital technology (including electronic mail) for the law of evidence 
have become better understood, the limitations of the Act have resulted in 
the courts’ continuing reliance on traditional, narrow common law rules 
rather than broader, new statutory rules. These limitations are in part due 
to the fact that the UEEA focuses on authentication and the best evidence 
rule, with scant attention paid to the hearsay rule and the business records 
exceptions, the application of which requires a clear concept of record and a 
clear methodology for identifying records in digital systems. Additional and 
more important limitations include the absence of provisions related to the 
search and seizure of electronic records in both civil and criminal cases;34 the 
protection of privacy; the ever-expanding retention and preservation duties 
for electronic records on the part of law enforcement offices, legal offices, 
and the courts; the spoliation, or purposeful destruction of electronic records 
to escape prosecution; and e-discovery. However, it is best to begin with an 
analysis of what the Act states and of the manner in which its statements are 
expressed. 
Analysis of the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act
In the Act, the ULCC shifted the focus of the authentication and best 
evidence rules from the record to the electronic system in which the record is 
contained, inferring trustworthiness from the integrity of the system, rather 
31 See also the B.C. Evidence Act, subsection 41.2(2). 
32 Commonwealth Secretariat, LMM(02) 12, “Draft Model Law on Electronic Evidence,” 
para. 4, available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/
%7BE9B3DEBD-1E36-4551-BE75-B941D6931D0F%7D_E-evidence.pdf (accessed on 20 
May 2010).
33 For example, Coco Paving (1990) Inc. v. Ontario (Transportation), [2009] ONCA 503; 
College of Opticians of British Columbia v. Coastal Contacts Inc., [2008] BCSC 617; R. v. 
Blumes, [2002] BCPC 45. 
34 On the issue of search and seizure, see for example, R. v. Bishop, para. 20–47.
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than ascertaining it from the form of the record and its status as an original.35 
If the litigant offering an electronic record as evidence can show that the 
system producing or storing it operates the way it is expected to, the output 
satisfies the evidentiary requirements, regardless of its form. The ULCC 
commentary following paragraph 1(b) of the Act states: “This Act focuses on 
replacing the search for originality, proving the reliability of systems instead of 
that of individual records, and using standards to show systems reliability.” As 
a factor in determining the reliability of a system, section 6 of the Act replaced 
the traditional identification of individual records by a witness or other 
foundation evidence with proof of compliance of the system with recognized 
records management standards, procedures, usages, or practices. 
The Act comprises nine sections, the first defining for the purposes of 
the Act the key terms used in it; the second establishing the limits of its 
application; the third providing for the application of the authentication 
rule; the fourth for the application of the best evidence rule; the fifth for the 
presumption of integrity; the sixth discussing the use of standards in support 
of the evidence offered; the seventh providing for a proof by affidavit; the 
eighth discussing the right of cross-examination; and the ninth advising that 
statutory rules requiring that the retention of paper originals of microfilmed 
records should be repealed. Each section includes paragraphs or subsections, 
which are the provisions or rules, each followed by comments having the 
purpose of explaining the rule or its application.
Section 1: Definitions
Like most statutes, the Act begins with definitions. In our view, its definitions 
are its major weakness because they are inconsistent with the current 
terminology in the electronic environment as it has developed in the context 
of research projects (e.g., the International Organization for Standardization’s 
[ISO] and other national and international standards), and records management 
best practices.
Paragraph 1(a) states: “data” means representations, in any form, 
of information or concepts. According to the commentary, the intent of 
paragraph 1(a) is to include in the concept of data any form of information 
that can possibly be part of the content of an electronic record, whether 
facts, figures, or ideas. The Province of Alberta is the only jurisdiction not 
to use the definition of “data” in its enactment of the Act. Section 41.1 of 
the Alberta Evidence Act omits the definition of “data,” and simply refers to 
35 According to diplomatics, the degree of perfection of a record is measured by its status of 
transmission – that is, whether it is a draft, a copy, or an original. The degree of perfection is 
lowest in a draft and highest in an original, which can, however, be substituted by an authen-
tic copy. 
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“information.” 
Paragraph 1(b) states: “electronic record” means data that is recorded 
or stored on any medium in or by a computer system or other similar 
device, that can be read or perceived by a person or a computer system or 
other similar device. It includes a display, printout or other output of that 
data, other than a printout referred to in subsection 4(2).36 This definition 
suggests that the defining characteristics of an electronic record are its 
method of inscription and capacity for access. Contrast this with the archival 
definition of a record: a document made or received by a physical or juridical 
person in the course of practical activity and kept for action or reference. In 
enacting paragraph 1(b), some jurisdictions, including the federal one, have 
replaced the phrase “electronic record” with “electronic document.”37 Indeed, 
by considering the fact of being a recording by a computer or similar device 
(which is the primary identifying characteristic of an electronic record), 
the Act provides an incomplete definition of record and ends up defining a 
document. Any information recorded by, or stored in, a computer or similar 
device, then, is considered an electronic record by the terms of the Act, and 
the qualities that would establish it as a record according to archival and 
diplomatic theory do not become relevant until tests for admissibility are 
applied. 
In fact, paragraph 1(b) is insufficient to identify an electronic record in 
such a way that the business records exception to the hearsay rule and the best 
evidence rule can be easily used; is also unclear and imprecise in what it does 
state. The phrase “computer system or other similar device” and the related 
commentary are confusing as to the phrase’s intended scope, in that a similar 
device can be external storage in a CD ROM, a magnetic tape, a backup drive, 
or a cellular telephone. The commentary says the definition does “not apply 
to telexes and faxes (except computer-generated faxes),” but these devices 
involve computer-like operations that generate and store information on the 
date and time of transmission, identification of intended sender and recipient, 
and success or failure of the transmission. Similarly, the commentary says the 
definition does not apply to “regular digital telephone conversations,” which, 
although not recorded, leave recorded traces in the same manner as faxes 
and telexes; and what about mobile telephones, text-messaging, and other 
similar communications? According to the commentary, video is not covered 
36 Subsection 4(2) states: “[In any legal proceeding] an electronic record in the form of a print-
out that has been manifestly or consistently acted on, relied upon, or used as the record of 
the information recorded or stored on the printout, is the record for the purposes of the best 
evidence rule.”
37 Canada, Canada Evidence Act, section 31.8; Manitoba, Manitoba Evidence Act, section 
51.1; Northwest Territories and Nunavut, Evidence Act, subsection 37.1(1); and Ontario, 
Evidence Act, subsection 34.1(1).
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by the Act, but computerized music and videos are included in the concept 
of data, thereby considering recorded music and videos “information,” and 
requiring their compliance with the strictures of the statutory requirements of 
authentication and best evidence. Prior to the Act, music, and still and moving 
images did not have to comply with the traditional best evidence rule, because 
they did not entail proof of verbal/numerical contents or “information,” though 
at common law they require authentication.
A further example of lack of precision in the commentary is the statement 
that the definition of electronic record applies to data that can be “read 
or perceived” by a computer or other similar device: if the data are only 
machine-readable, they are unintelligible to the judge and jury. Should they 
be inadmissible in a court of law?38  Later on, the commentary seems to 
clarify this by stating that “paper records that are produced directly by a 
computer system, such as printouts, are themselves electronic records, being 
just the means of intelligible display of the contents of the record”; however, 
a photocopy of a printout from a computer is a paper record and subject to 
the “usual rules about copies,” which means the common law best evidence 
rule would apply. The commentary says that when a printout is used as the 
record of an action, the electronic version ceases to be “the record” for the 
purposes of the “best evidence rule,” referring to subsection 4(2). The last 
phrase in paragraph 1(b), which lists types of electronic records, mentions 
displays, printouts, and other computer outputs, but expressly excludes from 
the category of electronic records those “referred to in subsection 4(2),” that 
is, those printouts that acquire a record function in place of their electronic 
version. This presents a problem when a party keeps both a printout and an 
electronic version of the same item and uses them interchangeably. When a 
discrepancy develops between the two versions, subsection 4(2) says the paper 
copy is “the record,” which means it would prevail over the electronic version, 
because it would qualify as having been consistently relied on, even though the 
same could be said of the electronic version. The commentary does not discuss 
the status of the digital copies of scanned records.
Paragraph 1(c) states: an “electronic records system” includes the 
computer system or other similar device by or in which data is recorded 
or stored, and any procedures related to the recording and storage 
of electronic records. The definition includes within a system not only 
operating equipment and a variety of storage media (“the computer system 
or other similar device”) but also the rules that control the creation, storage, 
access, security, verification, retention, and destruction of electronic records, 
regardless of whether they were followed. Despite the exclusion of records 
38 Powell v. Lenthall, [1930] HCA 43, 44 C.L.R. 470; R. v. Minaoui, [2004] VSCA 126; but see 
R. v. Bell and Bruce (1982), 26 C.R. (3d) 336, affirmed without reasons, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 287.
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from the definition of records system, in the commentary the paragraph 
addresses “procedures” in relation to such matters as “physical and electronic 
access controls,” and “retention or destruction schedules,” that is, in relation 
to records management. However, further on, section 4 contradicts this early 
emphasis on records management by saying that “records retention policies, 
for paper or electronic records, are beyond its [the Act’s] scope, and should 
not be determined by the law of evidence in any event.”  This assertion defies 
the statutory and common law rules relating to proof of authenticity by “chain 
of custody,” duties of preservation of evidence, destruction or spoliation 
of evidence and their evidentiary consequences (such as drawing adverse 
inferences), etc. In addition, the assertion conflicts with section 6 of the Act, 
which requires a presiding judge to take into account a “standard, procedure, 
usage, or practice” when applying any rule of law governing admissibility of 
records, thereby making records management pivotal in a judge’s decision as 
to admissibility, a decision that becomes part of the law of evidence.
Thus the definitions of data, electronic record, and electronic records 
system lack usefulness to the applicability of the admissibility rules of 
authenticity, best evidence, and hearsay to electronic records. Moreover, they 
are not sufficient to clarify the meaning of all provisions. Some jurisdictions 
have added definitions of additional terms to their enactment of the Act. For 
example, Canada and Manitoba added a definition of “computer system” to 
their legislation,39 although such definition suffers from circularity. It states 
that a “computer system” is “a device that, or a group of interconnected or 
related devices one or more of which, a) contains computer programs or other 
data, and b) pursuant to computer programs, performs logic and control, and 
may perform any other function.”
In our view, other terms used in the Act should also be defined. For 
example, subsection 4(1) of the Act speaks of the “integrity of the electronic 
records system,” but “integrity” is not defined in section 1, and the 
commentary to the Act refers to integrity as the equivalent of “reliability.” 
Alberta implicitly included incorruptibility and completeness as essential 
qualities of integrity by enacting its unique subsection 41.1(2), which 
emphasizes the relevance to integrity of “reliable encryption techniques.”40 
This subsection, which is only contained in the Alberta Evidence Act, states: 
“The integrity of an electronic record may be proved by evidence of the 
integrity of the electronic records system by or in which the information 
was recorded or stored, or by evidence that reliable encryption techniques 
were used to support the integrity of the electronic record.” However, a 
39 Canada, Canada Evidence Act, section 31.8; Manitoba, The Manitoba Evidence Act, section 
51.1.
40 Alberta, Alberta Evidence Act, 41.1(2). 
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clear definition of integrity is essential to the applicability of both the 
authentication and the best evidence rule, the determination of which should 
be based on a strong foundation of evidence consistent with clear conceptual, 
not technological parameters. 
Similarly, as mentioned above, section 6 of the Act refers parties and 
the courts to “a standard, procedure, usage, or practice” as important 
to admissibility, but the Act does not define or rank these terms. Is an 
internationally recognized or a governmental “standard” intended to have 
more authority in determining admissibility than a localized or specialized 
“usage” or “practice?” In the absence of statutory definitions for these terms, 
their meaning is uncertain until courts interpret them. Unfortunately, given the 
minimal judicial consideration of the Act to date, the courts have not helped 
in the interpretation of this section. Thus, it would be useful not only to define 
in the Act what a standard is but also to indicate what standard or family 
of standards should be adopted, because, like legislation, standards contain 
definitions which could ensure consistency in the interpretation of the Act for 
both those who need to offer electronic records as evidence and those who 
need to determine their admissibility. 
It would have been useful if the Act had clearly addressed the hearsay 
aspects of computer records. The common law distinguishes between records 
produced by systems without human intervention (such as mechanical 
calculations beyond manual computation, or where the device gathers 
information on its own initiative by monitoring and recording conversations) 
from records compiled by humans within electronic systems. At common 
law, records generated by computers without human intervention are non-
hearsay, and are admissible as real evidence rather than as statements made 
by persons.41 As real evidence, the Act provides guidance on authentication 
by a witness qualified to explain how the device operates, which is all that is 
required for admissibility.42 Records produced with human intervention are 
classified as hearsay at common law, but are admissible nevertheless if they 
fit within an exception to the hearsay rule, are authenticated, and constitute 
the best evidence. The Act provides guidance only on the second-tier issues of 
authentication and best evidence but does not deal with the primary question of 
admissibility, which is the hearsay rule.43 One must go outside the Act to find 
an existing common law or statutory exception, or the principled approach. 
The Act itself does not create a new exception to the hearsay rule, which is a 
serious omission in our view, and leaves a critical question unanswered within 
its own provisions. 
41 R. v. Hall, [1998] CanLII 3955, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2515(OL) (S.C.). 
42 D.P.P. v. Colm Murphy, [2005] IE CCA 1 (Irish Court of Criminal Appeal).
43 R. v. L.B., [2009] B.C.J. No. 1741 (OL) (S.C.).
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Finally, considering the centrality given to the integrity of the system 
containing the record to determine the record’s authenticity, it would be useful 
to add a definition of record-keeping system to the Act. Both the Canadian 
standard Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence (CAN/ CGSB-72.34-
2005) and the record-keeping family of ISO standards serve as a reference for 
such a definition.
Section 2: Application of the Act
This section of the Act explains the relationship between the subsequent 
provisions and existing evidentiary rules, but does so in an internally 
contradictory way. 
Subsection 2(1) of the Act and the related commentary state that the Act 
modifies only the evidentiary rules about best evidence and authentication. 
Contrary to this assertion, however, the commentary to section 3 on 
authentication says that the Act “codifies” the common law, which in this 
context means that it declares the existing common law without modification. 
If this is true, there cannot be enactment of subsection 2(1). This also 
contradicts subsection 2(2), which states that a court may have regard to 
evidence adduced under this Act in applying “any common law or statutory 
rule” to determine the admissibility of records, thereby extending the scope 
and application of the Act to exclusionary rules of evidence beyond best 
evidence and authentication, such as the hearsay rule and its exceptions.
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence is a matter for the presiding judge 
to decide. As mentioned above, in making a decision on whether or not to 
admit an item of evidence, the judge may have to examine foundation evidence 
relating to the issue of admissibility. The common law and statutory provisions 
prescribe the considerations for the judge in determining admissibility. 
Sections 4 and 6 of the Act add other factors for the judge to consider to those 
prescribed considerations when determining the admissibility of electronic 
records. Subsection 4(1) of the Act makes evidence of the “integrity of the 
electronic records system,” a consideration for the judge who is deciding on 
the admissibility of electronic records under the best evidence rule. However, 
subsection 2(2) had already made the same evidence admissible. Section 6 
purports to affect the admissibility of electronic records under “any rule of 
law” by authorizing the admissibility of a “standard, procedure, usage, or 
practice” relating to recordkeeping as foundation evidence, but, subsection 
2(2) had also already covered the scope of section 6. Some phrase linking the 
provisions would be helpful to clarify whether subsection 2(2) or section 6 
prevails in the event of a conflict with subsection 2(1).
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Section 3: Authentication
The purpose of this section of the Act is to codify the common law rule of 
authentication, requiring a person offering an electronic record as evidence 
to lay a foundation for its admissibility, by presenting to the presiding judge 
evidence that the record is what the person claims it to be.44 In this context, the 
reference to a “person” is ambiguous as the term could refer to a litigant or a 
witness, such as the witness who will authenticate the record. To differentiate 
between the roles of litigants and witnesses in regard to authentication, some 
jurisdictions replaced the phrase “what the person claims it to be” with the 
phrase “that which it is purported to be.”45  
The issue of whether this section merely codifies or actually modifies 
the common law has already been discussed. The commentary says: “The 
proponent needs only to bring evidence that the record is what the proponent 
claims it is (e.g., “This record is an invoice”).”  In our view, two omissions 
from a comprehensive definition of “authentication” are apparent in this 
passage: (1) the proponent must prove authenticity on a balance of probabilities 
(not merely introduce evidence capable of supporting a finding);46 and (2) 
the proponent must not only prove that “This is an invoice,” but also relate 
it to the issues in dispute in the litigation as part of authentication, by stating 
whose invoice it is and what is its significance.47 This concept of authentication 
as legislated is legally incomplete, rather than fully articulated. In fact, the 
commentary states: “The Act does not open an electronic record to attacks 
on its integrity or reliability at this stage. That question is reserved for 
the new ‘best evidence’ rule. Logically the question of integrity could be 
included in authentication, but the Conference decided that the question 
should be dealt with only once.” The grounds for such a decision are not 
explained, although they are implicitly stated in the following section; one 
can see, however, that by separating identity and integrity it would be possible 
to authenticate an electronic record of questionable integrity. Although 
traditionally the law has linked authentication to the ascertainment of the 
identity of a record, and the best evidence rule to an inference of integrity 
made from the degree of perfection of the record (i.e., the original is the first, 
complete, effective record), with electronic records, given the absence of an 
original, the two qualities of identity and integrity are interwoven to the point 
of being interdependent.     
44 Ross v. Redl Estate, [2008] SKQB 298, [2009] 3 W.W.R. 166, para. 26 and 27. 
45 The jurisdictions are: Canada, The Canada Evidence Act, section 31.1; Manitoba, The 
Manitoba Evidence Act, section 51.2; Northwest Territories and Nunavut, Evidence Act, 
subsection 37.1(4); Ontario, Evidence Act, subsection 34.1(4).
46 R. v. Evans, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, [1993] S.C.J. No. 115 (QL).
47 Lowe v. Jenkinson, [1995] B.C.J. No. 216 (QL); 5 B.C.L.R. (3d) 195 (S.C.).  
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Section 4: Application of the Best Evidence Rule
The exclusion of integrity from consideration in the application of the 
authentication rule becomes clear when reading this section on the application 
of the best evidence rule. The best evidence rule at common law applies 
where a party seeks to prove the contents of a document, and purports that 
the best or primary evidence is the original document. Secondary evidence, 
such a copy of the document, a witness’s recollection of what the document 
said, or a handwritten summary of the contents, is inherently suspect and 
the original is preferred if it is available. Where evidence of the contents of 
an electronic record is offered, subsection 4(1) states that the integrity of the 
electronic record-keeping system is a substitute for the traditional common 
law preference for the original. Subsection 4(1) only modifies, rather than 
abolishes, the necessity to offer the best evidence if a party wishes to prove 
the contents of an electronic record. Failure to satisfy the judge that the 
electronic record is the best evidence will result in its exclusion from the 
evidence in the case.48 However, this section greatly reduces the requirements 
for best evidence by focusing only on the integrity of the system. As Heather 
MacNeil writes, 
… the epistemically best evidence is … that which is most complete. The dimension 
of completeness is particularly pertinent to electronic records since structural and 
contextual elements of an electronic record may be stored separately from its content. 
In an electronic recordkeeping environment, adherence to a best evidence principle 
would entail an obligation on the part of the litigating parties to produce the record 
that contains all the relevant structural, contextual, and discoursive elements … 
The foundation evidence supporting a presumption of integrity should be capable 
of demonstrating not only the reliability of data input and verification procedures, 
but also the completeness of the procedures for reproducing original presentation 
features and annotations, to the extent that these are relevant to an understanding of 
the record’s content … This would entail, in turn, an obligation on the part of courts 
to come to grips with the question of what precisely constitutes a complete record and 
to assess the significance of missing elements.49  
This section, by underestimating the complexity of electronic records and 
of the systems producing and containing them, weakens the application 
of the best evidence rule practically to irrelevancy. Moreover, it conflicts 
with the corresponding sections of other general evidence acts, that permit 
secondary evidence provided by government, court, and business records to 
be introduced in support of the reliability of the content of the records offered 
in evidence.
48 R. v. Bellingham, [2002] A.J. No. 476 (QL), 2002 ABPC 41.
49 Heather MacNeil, Trusting Records, p. 56.
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Subsection 4(2) of the Act codifies a common law rule that came about 
in relation to a bank branch printout of account activities as “the record” for 
purposes of satisfying the traditional best evidence rule.50 Subsection 4(2) 
states that, if a printout is relied or acted on as the authoritative “record” of 
activities, it becomes the best evidence in the traditional sense of proof of the 
transactions recorded there. A printout that qualifies as “the record” under 
subsection 4(2) becomes the best evidence in the traditional common law 
sense, and not under the new best evidence rule formulated in subsection 4(1), 
as a result of the phrase, “other than a printout referred to in subsection 4(2).” 
To clarify that subsection 4(2) contradicts subsection 4(1), some jurisdictions 
added the phrase “despite subsection (1)” to their enactments of subsection 
4(2).51  
Subsection 4(2) essentially allows the out-of-court practices of the party 
that makes and keeps the records to determine the question of when a printout 
is acted upon with sufficient consistency to qualify as “the record,” with the 
exclusion from admissibility of other forms of the same record, even if they 
have not been destroyed and are still used. On the other hand, in the event of a 
disparity between the electronic version and that contained in a printout, if the 
business relies on the electronic version of the same record as more accurate, 
presumably the printout would be inadmissible under subsection 4(2), and the 
opponent could not introduce it as evidence in support of its version of the 
transaction. In other words, the person offering the record in evidence makes 
the choice of what version of a record existing in more than one version is the 
most accurate based on frequency of use; following this, both parties have to 
accept the record identified as the best evidence as such. This is consistent 
with what is stated in the commentary to the previous subsection, according 
to which, if an image is produced by scanning original paper records, it is up 
to the party offering the record as evidence to decide whether to submit the 
scanned image as best evidence (which would be assessed on the basis of the 
integrity of the system containing it), or the paper original (which would be 
assessed on the basis of the best evidence rule at common law).       
While it is a high point of principle that the record of a person or 
organization is that which is used in the usual and ordinary course of business 
for the purposes of the business (and later for reference), this presumes the 
admissibility of only one version of each record, either the born-electronic 
record or its printout, or either the paper record or its image. This blanket 
rule of allowing the decision on whether to submit a printout or its electronic 
counterpart, an electronic image or a paper original, if both exist and are used 
50 R. v. Bell and Bruce.
51 These jurisdictions are: Canada, Canada Evidence Act, subsection 31.2(2); Manitoba, 
Manitoba Evidence Act, subsection 53.2(2); Ontario, Evidence Act, subsection 34.1(6); and 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut, Evidence Act, subsection 37.1(6).
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by the party offering the evidence, seems to turn the best evidence rule away 
from its traditional purpose of protecting the courts from unreliable evidence. 
These provisions are open to abuse by a recordkeeper who, for example, 
astutely follows a practice of relying on self-serving printouts as authoritative.  
Section 5: Presumption of Integrity 
This section of the Act creates legal presumptions in favour of the integrity 
of an electronic records system. Legal presumptions create rules of law that, 
in this context, enable a litigant offering an electronic record into evidence 
to satisfy the judge that the electronic records system containing it possessed 
the “integrity” required by subsection 4(1) by proof of other facts, as defined 
by the paragraphs. If the party can establish those other facts, the judge must 
make a finding that the system satisfies subsection 4(1), without requiring 
the party to prove “integrity” directly rather than by inference from the 
established facts. The purpose of these presumptions is to facilitate the 
admissibility of electronic records by offering alternative ways of proving 
their integrity through establishing the “integrity of the electronic records 
system.”
The presumptions of integrity are rebuttable by the opposing party. 
They require an opposing litigant who wishes to dispute admissibility of an 
electronic record to make an objection of substance by offering “evidence 
to the contrary,” and not to make a serious issue out of an insubstantial or 
technical objection that the electronic record is not the best evidence. In a 
criminal case, the defence need only raise a reasonable doubt to rebut the 
presumption; and if the defence is successful in rebutting the presumption, 
the Crown can prove the integrity of the electronic records system by reliance 
upon another presumption or by introducing admissible evidence of integrity.52 
To satisfy the requirement of “evidence to the contrary” in a civil case, an 
opposing litigant must meet a higher standard of proof than an accused in a 
criminal case: the civil opponent must meet the standard of proof on a balance 
of probabilities to rebut the presumption.53 
Paragraph 5(a) creates legal presumptions to the effect that the judge 
must accept the claim of integrity for an electronic records system if credible 
evidence is offered that the system operated properly at all material times, or 
any improper operation did not affect the “integrity of the electronic record” 
and, apart from the improper operation that had no effect on the record, the 
integrity of the system was not assailed. In many cases it might be reasonable 
and fair to presume the reliability of a computer system, but the computer 
52 R. v. St. Pierre, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 791, 112 D.L.R. (4th) 619.
53 Pecore v. Pecore, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795, 2007 S.C.C. 17, at para. 24–26. 
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system to which the Act refers is one that is used for recordkeeping, and such 
a system involves interactions with human beings. The human element might 
raise doubts about human error or falsification, particularly for data contained 
in records made, received, or stored after a dispute has arisen. Also, when 
long-term preservation and accessibility of electronic records are involved, 
as is more frequently the case, systems can break down or become obsolete. 
One wonders whether the presumption of integrity of a computer system 
should apply regardless of the length of time elapsed from when a record was 
created or used to when it is offered as evidence. This is especially worrisome 
in the context of section 5(b) discussed below, which puts the onus of proof on 
the party who does not know the system and the procedures; in contrast, the 
law of evidence usually puts the onus on the party with the better means of 
knowledge.
Current expectations and legal requirements about how long certain 
electronic records must be preserved are increasing, thereby necessitating 
the permanent preservation of some records with high potential for use as 
evidence. This raises concerns about the practicality of requiring evidence of 
proper operation of the system “at all material times.” For example, consider 
the following recommendation from the Milgaard Inquiry: “All prosecution 
and police files, including police notebooks, relating to indictable offences 
should be retained in their original form for a year, then scanned and entered 
into a database where a permanent, secure electronic record can be kept.”54
In legal proceedings in which pre-trial discovery or disclosure of 
documents occurs, paragraph 5(b) applies the presumption of integrity of the 
system to electronic records recorded or stored, and produced by an adverse 
party. The party which obtained the production of the records has the benefit 
of this presumption to facilitate the admissibility of the opponent’s electronic 
records, but not the adverse party who was obliged to produce the records, 
which supposedly has a better knowledge of the system. 
The concept of parties who are “adverse” or “adverse in interest” applies 
more aptly to civil than to criminal proceedings, because the Crown and the 
accused are not necessarily in the same adversarial relationship as opposing 
civil litigants. In a criminal proceeding, the Crown must make disclosure 
of all its potentially relevant evidence to the defence, but not vice versa. 
There is no obligation on the defence in a criminal case to make equivalent 
disclosure of its evidence. It has been held that the Crown owes a duty to 
disclose evidence that might benefit the defence even though it is not, strictly 
speaking, “adverse in interest” to an accused in disclosing it.55 One cannot 
54 The Honourable Mr. Justice Edward P. MacCallum, Final Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Wrongful Conviction of David Milgaard (2008), available at http://www.
milgaardinquiry.ca (accessed on 8 June 2010).
55 R. v. MacNeil, [2009] SCC 3, 238 C.C.C. (3d) 353, at para. 13 and 50. 
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help wondering whether, if the defence decides to introduce the evidence 
disclosed by the Crown, it can rely on the presumption in paragraph 5(b) 
to support the admissibility of the evidence, since an adverse party did not 
make the disclosure. Clearly, this question arose in the context of the Canada 
Evidence Act, subsection 31.3(2), where the adjectival phrase, “adverse in 
interest” is replaced by the adjective “adverse,” thereby opening the issue to 
interpretation.
Paragraph 5(c) reflects the traditional concerns of an adversarial system of 
trial that suspects a record generated by, or on behalf of, a party to litigation, 
especially if this has happened any time after the dispute has arisen or was 
expected. The adversary system would be ill-served by offering temptation 
to litigants to generate and introduce self-serving evidence once litigation is 
underway or reasonably anticipated. In furtherance of that spirit, paragraph 
5(c) presumes integrity if the person who created or stored the electronic 
record is not a litigant in the proceedings or under the control of a litigant, 
and if the person created or stored the record as a regular part of a routine or 
system. The phrase in paragraph 5(c), “usual and ordinary course of business,” 
has become synonymous with “routinely,” “systematically,” or “regularly.”56 
The problem is that paragraph 5(c) makes the assumption that the parties 
to litigation are always joined as they should have been; sometimes, however, 
litigation is not set up properly and all the appropriate parties are not joined in 
the proceeding. Also, the person who created or stored the electronic record 
might have had an interest in the outcome of the litigation, even though not 
a party to it or under the control of a party. The opponent would have to 
raise these matters as “evidence to the contrary,” in an attempt to rebut the 
presumption. 
Section 6: Standards 
Section 6 states that the judge may consider evidence of a “standard, 
procedure, usage, or practice” in determining admissibility of electronic 
records under “any rule of law.”  This extends the Act beyond best evidence or 
authentication purposes to any rule of law governing admissibility, such as the 
hearsay, character, or opinion rule. This section thus contradicts section 2(1), 
which purports to limit the scope of the Act to the two rules: best evidence 
and authentication. 
We are concerned that the section and the commentary might be 
interpreted as taking authority away from presiding judges over questions of 
56 Young v. RBC Dominion Securities, [2008] CanLII 70045, [2008] O.J. No. 5418 (QL), 2008 
CarswellOnt 8158 (S.C.), para. 165.
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admissibility of electronic evidence in legal proceedings, and vesting authority 
to determine them in records professionals, or by agreement of the parties, 
through application of “standards, procedures, usage, or practice.” A records 
professional or a litigant might misread this provision and the commentary as 
offering an assurance (“take comfort”) of guaranteed admissibility for records 
kept in accordance with “a standard, procedure, usage, or practice” of the 
records professional’s own choosing, or with the litigant’s agreement. 
We believe that this interpretation is incorrect in the broader context of 
common law, and that records professionals should not presume that following 
standards or best practices will ensure that the records they are responsible 
for will be admissible in a court of law. Judges decide factual issues around 
admissibility of disputed evidence, including electronic evidence, not the 
parties or records professionals. For example, judges do not regard themselves 
as necessarily bound by parties’ records retention schedules. In criminal 
cases, judges often reject retention periods adopted by the police for its own 
records if they are unreasonably brief and the evidence might have assisted 
the defence. Sometimes, the judge orders a stay of proceedings because 
destruction of the evidence violated the accused’s Charter rights.57  
The phrase “standard, procedure, usage, or practice” covers a wide range of 
possibly contradictory, and, as the commentary to this section acknowledges, 
constantly evolving guidelines. The commentary identifies two “gold” 
standards of admissibility, specifying those issued by the Canadian General 
Standards Board (CGSB) and by ISO. The CGSB is an agency of the federal 
government that develops voluntary standards in various fields using the 
expertise of standards committees. The current versions of these standards 
are: Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence Standard, CAN-CGSB 
72.34 (2005); Microfilm and Electronic Images as Documentary Evidence 
Standard, CAN-CGSB-72.11-93; and Electronic Imaging–Information Stored 
Electronically–Recommendations for Trustworthiness and Reliability, ISO 
15801:2004. However, as mentioned above, the definitions contained in these 
standards are inconsistent with those of the Act and the guidelines provided by 
these standards are more often than not in conflict with the provisions of the 
Act. 
The commentary to section 6 states that a specific litigant’s own unique 
records management program can qualify as a “standard,” but we believe it 
should more accurately be referred to as a formally accepted and implemented 
policy, containing procedure and practices. The commentary suggests a party’s 
own “standard” would carry at least equal authority with other standards, etc., 
57 R. v. Maghdoori, [2008] ONCJ 129, 166 C.R.R. (2d) 157; R. v. Leung, 2008 ONCJ 110, 171 
C.R.R. (2d) 300; but see R. v. Badgerow, [2008] 58 C.R. (6th) 367, 169 C.R.R. (2d) 348 (Ont. 
C.J.).
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but such matters are for the judge to decide in the circumstances of each case 
and it would not be advisable for records managers to count on this suggestion. 
Assessing a party’s conduct according to the standard of a “well accepted 
practice” has been held to be inappropriate in another context;58 even though 
the commentary approves of it, judging a party’s conduct by compliance with 
the party’s own “practice,” could lead to pointless circularity.
On the issue of admissibility, section 6 allows records professionals to 
present evidence for and against the merits of various policies, including those 
that were followed and ignored. In determining admissibility, it would be up 
to the judge to decide which policy was appropriate in the circumstances and 
whether the creation, maintenance, and preservation of the disputed electronic 
record complied with the policy. 
Once the electronic evidence is ruled admissible, the trier of fact (judge or 
jury) can receive and consider it in its deliberations. Curiously, section 6 does 
not refer to weighing the evidence, only to determining admissibility. The role, 
if any, of a standard, etc., in determining the weight of evidence is left open. 
Section 7: Proof by Affidavit
Section 7 states that, instead of having to call witnesses to prove by their 
testimony the matters under subsection 4(2), and sections 5 and 6, these 
matters can be proven by affidavit. The witnesses do not need to attend the 
court proceeding to testify, unless the other party wants to cross-examine 
them under section 8 of the Act. There are many similar provisions in statutes 
and rules of court. The affidavit can contain hearsay (“based on information 
and belief”) and does not require the source to be identified, in contrast with 
other provisions at common law that permit hearsay in affidavits but require 
the disclosure of the name of the source of the hearsay. It is questionable 
how the cross-examiner could get anywhere with the cross-examination of a 
deponent on an affidavit when the deponent lacks personal knowledge of the 
facts deposed to, and does not reveal the identity of the source of the hearsay 
contained in the affidavit. 
Section 8: Cross-examination
Section 8 establishes the right of cross-examination by the adverse party, 
but this might not be as fair to the opponent as it might appear if the person 
who swore the affidavit (the deponent) has no personal knowledge and the 
affidavit is full of rumour. There is no provision to order costs against a civil 
litigant who unreasonably requires the attendance of a deponent for cross-
58 The Royal Trust Co. v. M.N.R., [1957] C.T.C 32, 57 D.T.C. 1055 (Exch. Ct.).
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examination, as is quite common in other contexts where the object of the 
provision is to shorten the length of trials by dispensing with the unnecessary 
attendance of witnesses.
Section 9: Repeal
Section 9 establishes that, except for Computer Output Microfilm, 
microfilmed records are not strictly “electronic records” within the scope of 
the Act. Nevertheless, the Act goes out of its way to recommend repeal of an 
exclusionary provision existing in some evidence acts. The general evidence 
acts of Canadian jurisdictions provide for the admissibility of microfilmed 
copies of paper documents. Some of these provisions confer upon the presiding 
judge discretion to exclude a microfilmed copy if the paper document was 
destroyed or lost within six years. The period of six years runs from the date 
at which the paper document would have been destroyed in the ordinary 
course of business (meaning routinely), or the date of notice of a claim to 
which the document relates. Exemptions variously protect admissibility 
of microfilmed government, court, or Bank of Canada records from the 
exclusionary discretion. 
The ULCC, in the commentary to section 9, argued that microfilmed 
records should be admissible, given sufficient support of their integrity, 
regardless of the time of destruction or loss of the paper version. The 
Conference recommended repeal of the exclusionary discretion, so that 
the parties’ wishes would prevail over the power of the courts to exclude 
microfilmed documents in favour of their paper originals. The recommendation 
did not affect the many Canadian jurisdictions whose evidence acts did not 
provide for an exclusionary discretion relating to microfilm. Only three of 
the concerned jurisdictions accepted the Conference’s recommendation.59 
The remainder rejected the recommendation and retained their exclusionary 
discretions.60 
Conclusion 
The fundamental concerns of the law of evidence with any type of evidence, 
including electronic records, are relevance, admissibility, and weight. To 
59 Nova Scotia, Evidence Act, section 22 [2002, c. 17, section 1]; Ontario, Ontario Evidence 
Act, section 34 [1999, c. 12, Sch. B, subsection 7(1)]; Yukon Territory, Yukon Evidence Act, 
section 40 [2000, c. 11, section 9].
60 Alberta, Alberta Evidence Act, subsection 40(3); Manitoba, The Manitoba Evidence Act, 
subsection 51(3); New Brunswick, Evidence Act, subsection 47(3); Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Evidence Act, subsection 27(3); Northwest Territories, Evidence Act, subsection 
48(3); Prince Edward Island, Evidence Act, subsection 31(3). 
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lawyers, judges, and others looking for guidance on the application of these 
concepts to computer-generated or stored evidence, the UEEA offers rules of 
admissibility focusing on authentication and best evidence tied closely to the 
computer technology of the 1990s. The Act does not provide any guidance 
with respect to issues of relevance or weight, and offers only cursory reference 
to other rules of law such as the hearsay rule. 
In its current form, the Act is subject to the criticisms that it perpetuates 
the increasingly irrelevant best evidence rule, fails to address hearsay issues, 
and conflicts with existing statutory exceptions.61 The most important failing 
of the Act, however, is its misleading treatment of electronic evidence 
as susceptible to governance by one set of brief rules that presupposes a 
fixed technology. While this approach might have been appropriate back 
in 1997–1998 when the Act was developed, the subsequent growth of 
digital technology has made it untenable. Digital technology raises the most 
profound challenges yet to the traditional evidentiary concepts of relevance, 
admissibility and weight, and puts into question the very idea of record as 
embedded in the admissibility rules of the law of evidence. In addition, the 
common understanding of relevance and weight is more open than ever to 
scrutiny in the digital world. When the Act was formulated, the profound 
impact of digital technology was not fully comprehended, and the Act suffers 
as a result. 
The implications of digital technology for the law of evidence are 
becoming better understood thanks to the contribution of various disciplines, 
among which diplomatics and digital forensics are prominent. While 
diplomatics has developed a detailed theory of what is a record in the digital 
world, digital forensics has delved into the complexity of digital systems and 
articulated the requirements for assessing their integrity. Both disciplines are 
having a strong impact on the meaning of best evidence and, in relation to it, 
of authenticity, and on the assessment of what qualifies as hearsay. 
As it regards best evidence, diplomatics has demonstrated how the 
concept of originality – which has lost its traditional meaning in the digital 
environment – can be substituted by the concepts of record identity and 
integrity, as determined and revealed by the metadata linked to the record. 
As it regards hearsay, digital forensics has brought to the fore the distinction 
between “computer-generated records,” or statements produced by computers 
without human intervention, and “computer-stored records,” or statements 
produced by humans using computers, and suggested that only the latter can 
be considered hearsay and be admissible under the business records exception 
to the hearsay rule. On the other hand, computer-generated records can only 
be admissible on the basis of their authenticity as inferred from the integrity 
61 See Chasse.
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of the system in which they reside.62
Digital evidence includes not only business records introduced by a litigant 
or defence counsel, but also materials that may be found in seized computer 
hard drives and backup media, real-time email messages, chat-room logs, 
ISP records, web pages, digital network traffic, local and virtual databases, 
digital directories, wireless devices, memory cards, and digital cameras.63 
These belong not only to business enterprises, but to private individuals. How 
can the context of the extracted information be presented and understood, 
and subsequently protected, in such a way that the integrity of the data is 
preserved? What are the rules of admissibility for such evidence?
We believe that these and other positions taken by diplomatics and digital 
forensics, together with the new understanding of digital records fostered by 
recent archival and legal research, suggest that dramatic changes to the Act 
are required, and that a new field of interdisciplinary knowledge needs to 
emerge that will provide the conceptual and methodological foundation for 
these changes. Successful legislation aimed at regulating the admission into 
evidence and the decision about relevance and weight of electronic records 
must result from an integration of the knowledge and perspectives of the legal 
and law enforcement professions, the records professions, and the information 
technology profession. Such an interdisciplinary approach will not only 
relieve inconsistencies in interpretation of electronic evidence, but also help 
individuals and organizations understand how they can create, maintain, and 
preserve digital materials to best ensure admissibility if they find themselves 
involved in legal action. But integration is difficult as all these professions 
have established systems of beliefs, theories, and methodologies; a dedicated, 
collaborative research effort is therefore required to reconcile conflicting ideas 
and to overcome inconsistencies by developing new concepts, principles, and 
methods that both incorporate and transcend established ideas. 
In this spirit, the present authors are conducting a research project64 that, 
62 George L. Paul, in Foundations of Digital Evidence (Chicago, 2008), pp. 141–45, argues 
persuasively that many computer-generated records are declarative statements that are indeed 
hearsay despite being twice removed from the courtroom.  Thus, he believes that a second 
exception to the hearsay rule is warranted, which considers admissible computer-gener-
ated records that were created and reside in a system whose integrity can be proven.  This 
would be the “system reliability” exception to the hearsay rule.  Note the similarity to the 
Act rule that substitutes the system integrity requirement for the best evidence requirement. 
But see Nathan Wiebe, “Regarding Digital Images: Determining Courtroom Admissibility 
Standards,” Manitoba Law Journal, vol. 28, no. 1 (2000), p. 61. 
63 Chet Hosmer, “Proving the Integrity of Digital Evidence with Time,” International Journal 
of Digital Evidence, vol. 1, no. 1 (2002), available at http://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/
ecii/ijde/articles.cfm?action=article&id=9C4EBC25-B4A3-6584-C38C511467A6B862 
(accessed on 22 May 2010). 
64 The Digital Records Forensics Project is a collaboration among the University of British 
Columbia’s School of Library, Archival and Information Studies (SLAIS), the Faculty of 
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starting from legal, diplomatic, forensic, and archival knowledge, aims 
at developing concepts and methods for identifying, authenticating, and 
acquiring digital records of individuals and organizations. These will allow 
the records management, archival, legal, judicial, law enforcement, and 
information technology professions to recognize records among all kinds 
of digital objects produced by digital technologies once they have been 
removed from their original system or changed from their original format, 
and to determine their authenticity. Methods and concepts are also being 
developed for maintaining records acquired from crime scenes or created by 
police to pursue crime over the long term so that their authenticity will not 
be questioned, and for addressing issues of privacy, privilege, and intellectual 
rights. This research is intended to form the theoretical and methodological 
content of a new discipline called “Digital Records Forensics,” resulting from 
an integration of archival diplomatics, computer forensics, and the law of 
evidence with the project’s newly developed knowledge. 
It is hoped that it will not be necessary to wait for the end of this and other 
research projects before appropriate changes can be introduced in the law of 
evidence at both federal and provincial/territorial levels; it certainly would 
be useful to the legislator, however, to go beyond the legal field to gain an 
accurate understanding of the digital records environment and to find answers 
to the complex issues concerning definitions, relevance, weight, and hearsay 
that the Act has not answered or adequately addressed. 
For electronic records to remain and be proved inviolate, for ensuring 
that “no sin … be committed against the … sanctity of archives through the 
wrongs done by wicked men,” for not being all “compelled to grope in the 
dark, to feel our way with our hands”65 but to be able to rely on our electronic 
records as evidence of our actions and transactions, present and past, it is 
essential that records professionals, participating in active citizenship, take 
part in the forging of legislative provisions that affect the use, management, 
and preservation of records and archives.66  
Law of the University of Washington’s School of Information, and the Computer Forensics 
Division of the Vancouver Police Department. The Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada generously supports the project. See www.digitalrecordsforen-
sics.org (accessed on 20 May 2010). 
65 Born, pp. 233, 237.
66 For example, the Sedona Conference, in issuing its principles for e-discovery, has made 
an effort to gain an understanding of records based on archival theory. Canadian records 
managers and archivists should seek the collaboration of the Sedona Conference. See the 
The Sedona Canada Principles Addressing Electronic Discovery (January 2008), avail-
able at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=canada_pincpls_FINAL_108.pdf 
(accessed on 18 October 2009). 
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Appendix 1: The Uniform Electronic Evidence Act
1. In this Act,
(a) “data” means representations, in any form, of information or concepts.
(b) “electronic record” means data that is recorded or stored on any 
medium in or by a computer system or other similar device, that can 
be read or perceived by a person or a computer system or other similar 
device. It includes a display, printout or other output of that data, other 
than a printout referred to in Sub-section 4(2).
(c) “electronic records system” includes the computer system or other 
similar device by or in which data is recorded or stored, and any 
procedures related to the recording and storage of electronic records.
Application
2. (1) This Act does not modify any common law or statutory rule relating to 
the admissibility of records, except the rules relating to authentication and 
best evidence.
2. (2) A court may have regard to evidence adduced under this Act in applying 
any common law or statutory rule relating to the admissibility of records.
Authentication
3. The person seeking to introduce an electronic record [in any legal 
proceeding] has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable 
of supporting a finding that the electronic record is what the person claims 
it to be.
Application of the best evidence rule
4. (1) [In any legal proceeding,] Subject to Subsection (2), where the best 
evidence rule is applicable in respect of an electronic record, it is satisfied 
on proof of the integrity of the electronic records system in or by which the 
data was recorded or stored.
4. (2) [In any legal proceeding,] An electronic record in the form of a print-
out that has been manifestly or consistently acted on, relied upon, or used 
as the record of the information recorded or stored on the printout, is the 
record for the purposes of the best evidence rule.
Presumption of integrity
5. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the electronic 
records system in which an electronic record is recorded or stored is 
presumed [in any legal proceeding]
(a) by evidence that supports a finding that at all material times the 
computer system or other similar device was operating properly or, if it 
was not, the fact of its not operating properly did not affect the integrity 
of the electronic record, and there are no other reasonable grounds to 
doubt the integrity of the electronic records system;
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(b) if it is established that the electronic record was recorded or stored by a 
party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party seeking 
to introduce it; or
(c) if it is established that the electronic record was recorded or stored 
in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a 
party to the proceedings and who did not record or store it under the 
control of the party seeking to introduce the record.
Standards
6. For the purpose of determining under any rule of law whether an electronic 
record is admissible, evidence may be presented [in any legal proceeding] 
in respect of any standard, procedure, usage or practice on how electronic 
records are to be recorded or stored, having regard to the type of business 
or endeavour that used, recorded or stored the electronic record and the 
nature and purpose of the electronic record.
Proof by affidavit
7. The matters referred to in subsection 4(2) and sections 5 and 6 may be 
established by an affidavit given to the best of the deponent’s knowledge or 
belief.
Cross-examination
8. (1) A deponent of an affidavit referred to in Section 7 that has been 
introduced in evidence may be cross-examined as of right by a party to the 
proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party who has introduced the 
affidavit or has caused the affidavit to be introduced.
8. (2) Any party to the proceedings may, with leave of the court, cross-
examine a person referred to in paragraph 5(c).
Repeal
9. [Repeal provisions which require retention of original after microfilming.]
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